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After becoming premier in October, 1919, Stambolisky's first task was that of signing the peace terms drawn up by the victorious Allies.

The Treaty of Neuilly, November 27, 1919, reduced Bulgaria to a smaller area than it had held before the First Balkan War of 1912 and imposed new burdens. Bulgaria lost the Aegean coast (Western Thrace) to Greece, southern Dobruja to Romania, and strips of land on the west to Yugoslavia. The army was limited to a total of 20,000. Reparations amounting to $450,000,000 were to be paid in thirty-seven years, beginning in 1921. The existence of Bulgarian minorities in all the neighboring states furnished a basis for revisionism which steadily grew, particularly after the rise of fascism throughout Europe in the thirties.[2] The provision for an exchange of populations with Greece greatly heightened the volume of refugees who streamed into Bulgaria, adding to the political ferment and economic burdens of the country. In these and other ways, the settlement exacerbated conditions under which radicalism throve.

Stambolisky won a commanding position in the parliamentary elections of March, 1920, and proceeded to ride roughshod over both the middle class and conservative parties on the right and the Communists on the left. He instituted a number of reforms, including a land law designed to break up the crown lands and larger estates, the imposition of a heavy income tax, and the establishment of a compulsory labor service which in the first four years of operation secured the equivalent of five million wage days of work for the Ministries of Public Works and Railways. In foreign policy he sought to fulfill the treaties and to effect a reconciliation with Yugoslavia among whose Communist and Agrarian parties his concepts of Slavic federation found support. His dictatorial methods, however, won him enemies on all sides, not least among them being the Macedonians who opposed his policy of rapprochement with Yugoslavia. In June, 1923, he was overthrown by a *coup d'état* organized by a group of intellectuals, led by Professor Tsankov, and the League of Army Reserve Officers, among whom Colonels Velchev and Georgiev were leaders. A few days later Stambolisky was assassinated.

Following the Stambolisky regime, the Tsankov government (1923-26) represented a swing to the right. "Communist" insurrections and violence were suppressed with great severity. The increased activity of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) caused difficulties at home and abroad, although after the assassination of its leader Alexandrov (1924) it was split into two factions under Protoguerov and Mihailov who became bitter rivals. A threat of war with Greece arose, but was averted by the action of the League of Nations. A more conciliatory government

[2] See G. P. Genov, *Bulgaria and the Treaty of Neuilly* (Sofia, 1935).

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642 668 under Liapchev (1926-31) sought to reduce party strife and international friction. It secured a loan from the League of Nations to help in the settlement of refugees, but seemed powerless to prevent raids upon neighboring states by the IMRO which, after the assassination of Protoguerov in 1928, was dominated by Mihailov who openly defied the Sofia government and virtually reigned supreme in some frontier districts. The elections of June, 1931 brought a shift again to the left. The cabinets of Alexander Malinov and his successor, Nikola Mushanov, both of whom were Democrats representing middle class and intellectual groups, were supported by the Agrarians. This coalition found itself threatened by the rise of the Communist party which nearly captured a majority in the Sofia municipal elections of September, 1932. In the communal elections of November, however, the Agrarians and Democrats won a victory which emboldened them in an attempt to suppress both the Communists and the Macedonians in the following year.

643 669 642 Meanwhile Tsar Boris III, had steadily gained in authority and influence. The rapprochement with Italy signalized by the marriage of Boris to the daughter of King Victor Emmanuel III in 1930, and the part played by the Tsar in steps taken toward reconciliation with Yugoslavia and Romania (1933-34) helped to bring him to the fore. Then a series of domestic events enabled the Tsar to make himself a virtual dictator. Colonel Velchev, secretary of the Military League founded in 1930, and Kimon Georgiev, prominent in *Zveno* which was a fascistic civilian organization working for reform and a "strong" government, again helped to stage a *coup d'état,* May, 1934, ousting the Democratic-Agrarian Coalition and making Georgiev premier of a dictatorial government with Velchev as his principal adviser. Parliament was dismissed and political parties dissolved by decree. Vigorous action was taken against IMRO, forcing Mihailov to flee. Most of the promises of the new government, however, and especially the solution of the financial crisis, remained unfulfilled. Velchev's known hostility toward Boris III and his alleged republicanism alienated older army circles which helped to supplant Georgiev by General Zlatev who had the backing of the Tsar. Continued financial mismanagement and a reaction within the army itself to its political activities paved the way for a return to civilian government and the dissolution of the Military League after several of its members, including Velchev, had been convicted of conspiracy. This left Boris III master of the situation, although he proclaimed his intention of restoring constitutional rule.

646 666 Since the anomolous political situation within the country brought an inevitable reaction against the regime, elections for a new *sobranie* were

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668 Communists, Agrarians, Democrats, and republicans. In the summer the
Soviet Union, against whom Bulgaria had not declared war, began to press
642 for the ousting of the Germans and a reversal of the policy pursued since
648 1941. On September 2, a new Bulgarian government, headed by a former secretary of Stambolisky, Konstantin Muraviev, and including former Premier Mušanov, announced the full restoration of democratic freedom and rights, a return to neutrality, and the nullification of the Tripartite Pact. It also dispatched representatives to Cairo to negotiate an armistice with Great Britain and the United States and, on September 8, declared
721 war on Germany. In the meantime, however, Russia, not fully satisfied
642 with the course being pursued, declared war on Bulgaria on September 5. This confusing situation was clarified four days later when Muraviev was succeeded by a new government which had the full support of the "Fatherland Front." It was led by Kimon Georgiev, who was alleged to have experienced a change of heart since his participation in the *coup d'état* of 1934, and included his former colleague, Colonel Velchev.

Before the end of September Russian military forces had moved into the country and were rapidly turning the Bulgarian army, now placed under the command of a Russian General, Tolbukhin, against the fleeing
728 Germans. By the formal armistice terms, signed in Moscow on October 28, 1944, Bulgaria promised to withdraw from all territories occupied in Greece and Yugoslavia, to restore all properties of the United Nations and make reparation for damages, to rid Bulgaria of all pro-Axis organizations, to coöperate in the arrest and trial of war criminals, and to accept an Allied Control Commission which would regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice. Since Russia held a dominant position in the Commission and since Bulgaria was prepared to follow Communist leadership, her lot as an ex-Axis satellite differed little from that of Yugoslavia.

Reconstruction and Peacemaking

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●669 Reconstruction in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria took the form of a revolution led by Communists and was patterned after the policies and practices of the Soviet Union.

The National Front in Yugoslavia

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642 The Tito government, established in Yugoslavia in 1945, promised that
631 it would "comply with the fundamental and general principles of constitutional government" and that it intended to found a democratic, federative state. This was to consist of Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Provisional governments were formed in each of these units in April and May, 1945. While Tito's ter-

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THE PASSING OF DEMOCRACY

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The announcement that Bulgaria had abandoned on May 19, 1934 the Parliamentary and democratic system of government and set up in its place a military semi-Fascist dictatorship was received with undisguised regret in countries where the democratic traditions were deep-rooted and traditional. This act of Bulgaria, which was considered as the most democratic country in the Balkans, was viewed with disappointment and vexation, it was considered as an open defection of a minor member of the same confraternity of liberal-minded peoples, to the triumph of whose conceptions and principles of government is due in the main, the progress achieved by the Western nations.

Such an opinion, however it might appear concordant with outward appearances. does not seem to be justified. For Bulgaria was never a democratically governed country, in spite of its Parliament and Constitution. And as for M. Kimon Gheorghiev and his colleagues, who effected the coup d'état, no one can uphold that they resemble in the least Plato's tyrant who, serves as prototype to modern dictators. This model tyrant was characterised by effecting „Just the reverse of medical purgation. For doctors remove the worst and leave the best; he does the opposite." (G. Lowes Dickinson, „The dialogues of Plato" p. 155). The Gheorghiev government far from putting into practice such precepts, has on the contrary administered the most salutary „purges" to Bulgaria, which effected a true catharsis, delivering the State from such disintegrating elements as the Macedonian Revolutionary organisation and the political coteries. The military who planned, car-

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ried out and imposed the change of government did this much against tneir will, and only after repeated warnings and objurgations to the politicians to mend their ways, had failed to call the latter back to reason and to duty. Far from assuming sole control of the ship of state, they have appealed to men of character and integrity and sought their co-operation and they have even confided to these civilians the direction of some of the most important branches of the administration. This liberal attitude is again in direct contradiction with the traditional behaviour of the model tyrant of Plato, for „he must have a sharp eye also for the man who is courageous or high minded or wealthy; and it is his greatest happiness to have to be the enemy of all such whether he like it or not, and plot against them until he purge the city of their presence.... Apparently he must do it if he is to rule". It is obvious therefore that the semi-military oligarchy which has assumed the reins of power in Bulgaria differs radically from the traditional enemy of democracy. In justice to the men who effected the coup d'état, it must be admitted, that they have never declared themselves admirers or exponents either of Fascism or of Hitlerism, and that they have never impugned democracy for faults which sprang from the abandonment of democracy. Their overt aim was to stave off corruption which was threatening the State with dissolution and to implant civic duties among their countrymen which will eventually render them fit for self-government. In fact by conforming themselves to Lysistrata's recipe they attempted to inculcate among their compatriots the idea of Good Citizenship, (this was according to Meredith the dominant idea of Aristophanes comedies.).

> „ . . . Next, for the clubs, the cabals, and the coteries,
> banding unrigtheously, office to win,
> Treat them as clots in the wool and dissever them,
> lopping the heads that are forming therein.
> Then you should card it, and comb it, and mingle it,

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all in one basket of love and unity,
Citizens, visitors, strangers, and sojourners,
all the entire, undivided community."

The first effect of liberty on those who are unprepared for it is often confusion, if not license, and the Bulgarian people were never trained to make a judicious use of the rights which the ultra-liberal Constitution prematurely foisted on Bulgaria, conferred on them. So far, Bulgarian political leaders, with some very rare exeptions, though they have masqueraded under every conceivable brand of democracy, ranging from social-democracy to make-believe Liberalism („Conservative" was too unattractive a party name for the astute and cunning Bulgarian demagogues to parade under and even those of conservative tendencies preferred to disguise themselves in the garb of the progressive, or of the populist) have miserably failed to educate the Bulgarians as to the elementary duties of citizenship; on the contrary all they did was to cultivate among them an inordinate sense of their rights, which was fostered by intensive appeals to their egoistic instincts. It is only those who are superficially acquainted with the inner working of parliamentary and democratic forms of government in most European countries that can remain intransigent supporters of all forms of self-government. For the latter often assume the most repulsive aspect of government, that leading to wholesale corruption and to the undermining of the moral fibre of a nation. The unlimited vista of putridity recently revealed in France and Rumania by the Stavisky scandal, and the Scoda affair, which impelled even a former Rumanian Premier, Dr. Vaida-Voevod to make on March 23, 1933 from the tribune of the Rumanian Chamber the astounding admission „that thare was something rotten in the organism of his country which must be amputated and cleansed before it could aspire to health", show that it is paying lip service to

661 the whole length and breadth of our unhappy country and it is the worst form of corruption we have yet experienced for it has revolutionised village life from its very foundations." This depressing diagnosis is confirmed by Dr. Djidrov, a distinguished economist and political writer, who in a speech in the Sobranye on Nov. 16, 1927 characterised the Agrarian regime as „the most destructive Bulgaria had experienced and the one which completed the ruin caused by the war." The nefarious influence which this high flood of demagogy has had on village life in general may be gauged by the concluding lines of M. Petko Rossen's most readable and instructive book „Among the people," and published in 1933: „Every right-thinking man who is capable of observation will be struck with dismay. To-day our village is in the pangs of such a religious, moral and public crisis, that he who entertains the hope of saving the State and public order on this, the thickest layer of our community, is bound to seek refuge in a monastery in his despair."

• 669 The Ministerial crisis which broke out in May 1934 was pregnant with grave consequences. Bulgaria was faced with the dilemma of placing the Agrarians, the most numerous political party, anew in the seat of power, or of delivering herself up, hands and feet bound to Prof. Tsankov, who had in the meanwhile donned a brand-new black shirt of a Fascist, and was garrulously exhorting his compatriots to adopt the Mussolinian creed. It was a case of Hobson's choise, with the certitude of a bloody trial of strength between the two rival factions, both being resolutely intent to secure control of the administration at all costs. This spelt anarchy and civil war, to avoid which, the military stepped in between the combattants, before the latter were quite ready for the fray. It was neither greed nor ambition which had goaded the military on the high road of politics, but the consciousness that

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their intervention was indispensable to safeguard their country and stave off disaster. 669

Far seeing and patriotic Bulgarians had long since sensed the dangers inherent in the pseudo-democratic system hitherto in force. The master-mind of Stoyan Mihailovski was far back as 1919, in a series of articles published in the *Napred*, launched a campaign in favour of installing in power „an iron-handed saviour". He expounded that there could be no democracy in Bulgaria so long as the soul of the average Bulgarian is not recast and rendered capable of solidarity and love for its fellows, and that it was imperative to teach first what constituted duty and that after that Bulgarians could be initiated as to what rights they possessed as members of the community. The head of the Bulgarian Church, the venerable Excharch Joseph in an interview granted to Richard von Mach, on Feb. 24, 1914, and recorded in the latters' „Aus Bewechter Balkanzeit" likewise stressed the need of a strong and virile leader such as was Stambulov", a purified Stambulov". And Dr. Djidrov, who is a socialist in principles, in a political pamphlet published in 1934, in which he enlarged on the impasse, party government had brought Bulgaria to, could suggest no other course of salvation than that of appealing to Tsar Boris to exert himself autocratic powers, a course which could be followed without violating the Constitution, and by giving a rather elastic interpretation to some of its articles!

The writer, as a pupil of the late L. T. Hobhouse does not wish to be mistaken for an advocate of the authoritarian State. It savours too much of the Hegelian conception of the State, completely demolished by that masterly criticism of L. T. Hobhouse as expounded in the latter's „Metaphysical Theory of the State." The present writer realises the truth of his master's statement that „if efficiency is improved at such cost of freedom as to destroy

them remember that G. B. Shaw, another irrepressible wit, who has much in common with Mihailovski, made one of his characters say of the British: „Every true Englishman detests the English. We are the wickedest nation on earth and our success is a moral horror." (Cusins in „Major Barbara.")

NEW BROOMS SWEEP CLEAN

The most important and the most difficult achievement of the Gheorghiev Cabinet was the suppression of the Macedonian revolutionary organisation. Since the Balkan wars, the Macedonian revolutionaries were almost autonomous rulers in the south western districts of Bulgaria, in which they levied taxes and administered summary justice. This region formed a fortress whence no Bulgarian Government had been able to dislodge them in spite of repeated efforts. From this retreat, the revolutionaries were able to control the whole body of Macedonian immigrants in

exporters to that country on their guard, and in order to bring the book to their knowledge made an application for the insertion of an advertisement on his book in the annual „Report" on that country prepared by the „Department of Overseas Trade" and published by H. M. Stationery Office. The latter, after acknowledging a cheque sent to defray the cost of publication, reimbursed the money three months later, and when pressed for an explanation, the writer received this edifying answer: „the book contained material of a political and critical kind, some of it hostile to the Rumanian Government. It is therefore obvious that in the interest of diplomatic comity such a book could not possibly be advertised in an official publication of H. M. Government." British citizens must obviously congratulate themselves on possessing such internationally-minded public servants who place diplomatic comity before national interest; though this extreme deference to ceremonial forms has cost Lancashire manufacturers dearly. Had the facts exposed in this book been brought to their notice, there is little doubt that a large part of their two million sterling risked lightheartedly since 1932 in Rumania, and now apparently as good as lost, would never have left our shores at all.

669 Bulgaria and keep them in readiness for an eventual military invasion of their native country. It is this latent danger which incited the neighbouring Balkan States to make such persistent efforts at Sofia for the dissolution of the Macedonian organisation. The removal of this ever present peril of war through the sudden incursion of Macedonian bands in Yugoslav, or Greek territory, has vastly increased the chances of a Bulgaro-Yugoslav rapprochement and promoted the work of pacification in the Balkans. Even if the Gheorghiev Cabinet had left no other record of its activities than this suppression of the Macedonian organisation, this would be sufficient for it to have secured a valid claim to the gratitude of all peace loving men and of the Bulgarian people above all. For the activities of the revolutionaries made themselves felt in Bulgaria far more than abroad, frequent murders, blackmailing, terrorism, flouting of justice, disregard for the prestige of the State's authority by the adherents of the revolutionary organisation, rendered its survival in Bulgaria a public danger and a factor of demoralisation, since the crimes and abuses its votaries committed were but very rarely punished.

631 Another laudable reform was the reduction of the
663 administrative districts from sixteen to seven, while the rural communes, numbering 2552, were reduced to 800 approximately. This change will not only effect a diminution in the administrative staff and an economy in expenditure, estimated at between 80 to 100 million leva annually, but will also permit of a more rational economic organisation of the country. By regrouping the rural communes
632 and lessening their numbers, more resources will be avai-
663 lable for the communal autorities to carry on their work with more effectively. The perpetual feuds between villages over the possession of communal lands over which so much treasure and time was spent have ceased as if by

THE WORLD WAR

Though the situation of the Bulgarian army was known to be critical, yet no one in Sofia foresaw that disaster was imminent. The offensive, undertaken in September 15, against the Bulgarian positions at Dobro Pole met with complete success, the defence was overwhelmed and a complete breach through secured, which permitted the Entente troops to advance unopposed up the Vardar valley, attaining Veles by September 26. But apparently the extent of the disaster was not fully realised in Sofia. Malinov telegraphed to the Bulgarian representative in Berlin on September 19, insisting on the Germans conceding the Bulgarian demands on the Dobrubja in order that the morale of the troops might be raised. On September 21 Ferdinand who was in Uskub, was advised of the critical position of the army and that there was little hope of help arriving from Germany in time to retrieve the situation. It was only on September 23 that the Bulgarian army Headquarters informed the Government that some 10 divisions with artillery would be needed to stop the gap made by the enemy. A ministerial council was convoked, and on September 23 without the consent of Ferdinand, decided to demand the cessation of military activities. A Bulgarian delegation left for the front and on September 29 an armistice was concluded at Salonica. Malinov hastened to advise the German Minister in Sofia on September 26 of these intentions of his Government, and that it was useless to send help from Germany as it would arrive too late. Demoralisation had set in meanwhile in the army; the Government attempted to induce the troops to hold their positions until the conclusion of the Armistice by dispatching certain Agrarian deputies to the front headed by Stambuliiski who was purposely set free from prison, where he had been kept since the beginning of hostilities, and on September 27, Stambuliiski proclaimed a republic and made preparations for overthrowing the Go-

728 669 vernment, but was unable to carry through his plan for lack of support. People were averse to any change in the Government at this critical time fearing lest the delegates sent to Salonica might be prevented from coming to terms with the Entente through the invalidation of their credentials brought about by such a change. In spite of the disapproval of this plan, the mutinied troops headed by Stambuliiski's colleague, R. Daskalov, attempted to march on Sofia but were dispersed on its outskirts by the few loyal troops which rallied to the support of the Government and with the assistance of some Germans who had just arrived from Odessa. On October 1, the delegation sent to Salonica returned; on the following day a conference of the leaders of all the political parties took place and Malinov was commissioned to inform Ferdinand that he owed a certain reparation to Bulgaria. With great reluctance and after vain pleading Ferdinand was persuaded to abdicate in favour of his heir, signing a manifesto to this purpose on October 3 and left for Germany followed by Radoslavov under the protection of German troops.

728 The demobilisation of the army to some extent appeased the existing discontent, in spite of the difficulties the Government was meeting through the exhaustion of foodstuffs. The dearth was relieved through the timely arrival of flour from the United States. The Malinov Cabinet resigned on November 19 as a protest against the Entente's decision to cede southern Dobrudja to Rumania, contrary to the stipulations of the Salonica Armistice. It was succeeded by a broad coalition ministry presided over by T. Todorov. In May the Cabinet was reconstructed with the participation of Stambuliiski in view of the holding of elections on August 17 at which however, no party obtained a majority. The Agrarians being the most numerous party in the new Chamber assumed the task of con-

661 the reins of power he would only hand them over to the
648 Communists, „my faithful hounds", as he aptly styled them. This open flirtation with the Soviets estranged him from the more sensible leaders of the Green international and this prevented him from heading this movement. When the Bolsheviki were on the outskirts of Warsaw in the summer of 1920, he became so elated at their success as to remark to a group of intimate friends that it would not be long before he would administer to the Entente the lesson it deserved. In April 1923 it became known that he contemplated celebrating his jubilee on August 30, when an extraordinary congress of the Agrarian Union was to be convoked for the purpose. In May he declared that he was about to convene an extraordinary Sobranye for the purpose of altering the Constitution and proclaiming a republic. He withdrew secretly 100 million leva from the Bulgarian National Bank for the pretended purpose of bribing the members of the Reparation Commission at Sofia and obtaining their consent. The threat of a repu-
• 669 blican move was taken advantage of by Stambuliiski's numerous opponents to persuade Tsar Boris to give his consent to the overthrow of his too domineering Prime Minister, and on June 9, 1923, the Agrarian regime was unexpectedly overthrown, after Tsankov, Smilov and Kazazov had obtained from Tsar Boris the signature of the decrees appointing the new Government, (Cf. Gr. Tsesmedjiev's", Rays of light on the mystery of the conspiracy").

No one was averse to this consummation, and even foreign governments made it known that they would acquiesce in this move owing to the deplorable effects the Agrarian regime was having on such foreign capital as was invested in Bulgaria as well as on the public finances of the country. In fact after the fall of the regime, criminal proceedings were instituted against practically all the members of the Agrarian Government, who were indicted for

appropriating public funds, issuing false documents and violating the Constitution. The minutes of the Sobranye sittings of July 1924 are full of details about the malpractices committed by the Agrarian regime. When the budget for 1924 came up for discussion, the Minister of Finance, M. Peter Todorov, announced that 70 million leva had been found in Stambuliiski's home, but that Stambuliiski must have appropriated at least 120 millions. That there had been an item of 6 million gold francs in the budget of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, destined for propaganda, (this will explain the dithyrambic peans sung by foreign journalists on the activities of these *sui-generis* Agrarian reformers) and what of this sum was not spent abroad was divided up among the Ministers. It was stated that Stambuliiski was shot down on June 14 while trying to flee from his capturers. Minister Pechev in his „Historical Events and Actors", relates that he was cut down in his own vineyard where he was buried. In order that his corpse might not be found it was subsequently removed and hidden on the banks of the Maritsa, from which hiding place his father was allowed later to fetch it and bury it at the village of Tsangarly.

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Stambuliiski had attempted to oppose the coup d'état. According to the version of deputy S.Vassilev, he rallied some peasants to his support and marched at their head to seize the town of Tatar-Pazardjik where regular troops easily overwhelmed him, for most of the peasantry made common cause with the army and turned against him. He was being convoyed to Sofia and while traversing his village was killed in a fray provoked by the villagers, but it is not known whether they had sought to kill or to liberate him. The only other place where the Agrarians displayed some resistance was at Pleven, under the leadership of Obov, a colleague of Stambuliiski. A few weeks previously, so sure was the latter of his posi-

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669 tion that he had declared: „The Agrarian Union will govern Bulgaria for at least forty years more".

It must not be thought that Stambuliiski remained to the last the favourite of the peasantry. His popularity was on the wane. The relative freedom from taxation enjoyed by the rural masses under his regime was offset by the arbitrary exactions of his local henchmen. What kept him in power so long was his reckless appeals to the prejudices of the ignorant rural masses and his reiterated bombastic assurances that they were predestined to break up and replace the collapsing urban culture through the Green International, (the international peasant federation).

RECENT HISTORY: 1923—1935

The coup d'etat of June 9 1923 was brought about by a handful of patriots supported by the army with the object of restoring the political liberties of the population which had been suppressed by the Agrarians, and one of the first acts of the new Government, presided over by Prof. Alexander Tsankov, was to release all the incarcerated politicians from their prison at Shumen. The Tsankov Government believed that it could achieve the pacification of the country by restoring constitutional methods and on its advent to power, it went out of its way in endeavouring to govern according to prescribed parliamentary forms. For this reason, it wasted most of its energy in attempting to fuse under its sponsorship the various political parties into one and thus obtain an imposing majority in the new Chamber. It overlooked however, one essential fact, namely that the masses after having tasted power would no longer allow themselves to be governed by a small minority, such as the urban po-

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pulation, however well intentioned the latter might be. The rural masses had got drunk on the spoils of office and were decided not to renounce such advantages as detention of power conferred on them. Democratic government was no longer possible in Bulgaria, now that the masses had become conscious of their power, except in the form of a semi-Bolshevik dictature as had just been experienced, (the writer does not wish to cast a slur on the Russians by comparing them to the Bulgarian Agrarians, for the former are certainly idealists and therefore worthy of respect even if we do not share all their views), or in that of a Communist commonwealth. Had Tsankov attempted to govern as a dictator, and proclaimed martial Law at the time of his advent to power he would have discouraged both Agrarians and their friends and allies, the Communists, from lifting their heads; but by reiterating as he did, his devotion to constitutionalism he simply incited Agrarians and Communists to regain office.

Tsankov and his colleagues among whom the most prominent were the Radical Peter Todorov, Minister of Finance, and the Socialist D. Kazazov, Minister of Railways, were still convinced devotees of democratic forms. They had not yet drawn the logical inferences from recent events which had effectively demonstrated the dangers inherent in the exercise of power by an untutored democracy and they had evidently not heard of the salutary counsel Sir Norman Angell had recently dispensed, namely that: „We may hope to make democracy safe if we face squarely the fact that the voice of the people is usually the voice of Satan."

If Democracy were to be maintained in an undiluted form, the Agrarians and Communists forming the vast majority of the people, had every title to the privileges of office, and consequently Tsankov and his supporters were simply wasting their time in a vain attempt to clothe them-

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669 selves in the garb of legality. So sure were the Communists of securing with the support of the Agrarians an overwhelming majority at the new elections which had been fixed to take place in November, that Vasil Kolarov, the secretary of the Moscow International, and a Bulgarian by birth, who had been dispatched by Zinoviev to stir up a revolution in Bulgaria, on the fall of the Agrarian regime disregarded these orders, for Bulgarian Communists convinced him that the eventual triumph of the social revolution in Bulgaria was assured of itself. The growing agitation of the Communists, finally alarmed the Tsankov Government and induced it to arrest the leaders, and the Communists fearing they would thereby be seriously handicapped in the approaching electoral struggle decided to revolt in September 1923. The movement miscarried because the bulk of industrial workers as well as its intellectual urban leaders refused to rise[1] and only the rural teachers, who were fanatical devotees of Communism and who had succeeded in imparting their convictions to the Agrarian masses amongst whom they moved, answered the call. These deluded idealists were convinced that the Soviet army would come to their help and in heroic abnegation, worthy of a better cause, placed themselves at the

[1] Mr. Iordan Tabakov, who has written some very enlightening books on social questions does not entertain a very high opinion of the professional political leaders of the Communist party. According to him, most of the subsidies they received from the Soviets they used for building houses for themselves. As for the rank and file, their main incentive was plunder. In September 1923 the Communist bands which went to attack the town of Lom and were dispersed, abandoned in their flight a big quantity of bags which they had brought with them in order to carry away loot. (Cf. „Causes of Social Chaos in Bulgaria.") This proves convincingly that these Bulgarian candidates for Communism are far from being adjusted to it, and that consequently they are not fit for any less chaotic social order than our own.

head of youthful peasant converts and set about capturing municipalities, evicting the mayors and proclaiming the commune in anticipation of the advent of the Russians who never came. Considerable damage was caused and some 3,000 were killed in this outbreak. Some 2,500 of those who participated in these risings had fled into Yugoslavia and persisted in carrying on an active agitation against the Tsankov Government which was continually provoked by an underhand campaign conducted by both Agrarians and Communists. M. Malinov, who was the leader of the legal Opposition in the Sobranye, far from criticising Tsankov for the measures he took to repress this agitation, on the contrary approved them. Speaking in the Sobranye on September 10, 1924 about a manifesto circulated by the Communists and Agrarians in which a new insurrection to be followed by an irruption of the political refugees in Yugoslavia was being preached, he affirmed that this was a provocation and a challenge which no Government could allow to pass unheeded and that it ought to be taken up and drastically dealt with. The Socialist leader Sakuzov who followed, fully agreed with Malinov and admitted that the policy of repression adopted by the Government had been forced upon it by the Agrarians.

The Government was now giving all its attention to the merging of all the political parties into one, that of the Democratic Entente. But in so doing they overlooked the necessity of sifting the wheat from the chaff and allowed the incorporation in the newly created political amalgam, of compromised politicians who prevented it from coalescing into a workable entity, and whose presence moreover, obstructed the inclusion of a certain number of more idealistically disposed politicians who refused to co-operate with these discredited individuals. As a result, the much-striven after unity was only temporarily and partially attained. The Democratic, Radical, and Socialist parties continued to

665 subsist, though, in a weakened form, their individuality having been sucked out of them as several of their members transferred their allegiance to the Democratic Entente, into which other political parties with a worse record, allowed themselves to be wholly absorbed as they had little chance of surviving as distinct entities. This effort of Tsankov to rejuvenate parliamentarism by creating a new political force miscarried. Since it only succeeded in forming a desiccated body without a soul which was nothing else save a combination of interests and appetites. It dealt a fatal blow to the existing democratic forces by undermining the stability of such existing political parties as the Democrats, Radicals and Socialists, which it had taken half a century of efforts to develop, and which, on the whole, were promising political forces. The Government dissolved the Communist party in 1924 and declared it illegal, forcing thereby its activities into underground channels. Both Agrarians and Communists were now openly receiving subsidies from Yugoslavia and they started a campaign against the Macedonian organisation, assassinating its famous leader, Todor Alexandrov, on August, 1924. Retaliatory murders followed and prominent Communists were executed by the Macedonians. The Communisst, and Agrarians constituted a common front and organised brigand bands which terrorised the country, amply supplied with arms and money from Russia and Yugoslavia. The official organ of the Agrarians, the *Zemledelsko Znome*, which was now being published in Yugoslavia early in June began inserting incendiary articles foretelling the near outbreak of a revolution in Bulgaria and inviting Tsar Boris to leave the country. The police was helpless to put a stop to the prevailing terrorism, the intensity of which may be gauged by General Russev's, (The Minister of the Interior) declaration in the Sobranye on June 17, 1924: „I walk in the streets of Sofia with the same feeling

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as when I was visiting the trenches during the war". Between October 1923 and the end of April 1925 there had been thirty two armed incursions into Bulgaria by the emigrant Agrarians in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless the Cabinet in spite of all this provocation did not apply any extraordinary repressive measures and it was only after the attempt on the life of Tsar Boris and the blowing up of the cathedral in which the whole Cabinet, the officer corps and prominent members of Sofia society were present on April 16, 1925, for the funeral of a general who had been murdered by Communists, (in which outrage 128 were killed and several hundred wounded) that martial law was proclaimed and the Government proceeded to deal with a heavy hand with its opponents. But the revolt which followed can hardly be ascribed to the belated severity of the Tsankov Government, for the Agrarians had not ceased to declare the imminence of an outbreak aiming at the overthrow of the Government. The revolt was ruthlessly quelled and unwonted violence shown on both sides; for a few months a veritable reign of terror prevailed. It is computed that over 20,000 were killed and serious destruction to property was inflicted. But no Government could have done otherwise after the provocation it had received, and the incitements to vengeance on the part of the relatives of the victims of the outrage of April 16, with which it was besieged. Taking advantage of the unrest which obtained, the Greek dictator Pangalos seized the occasion to invade distraught Bulgaria hoping to win thereby easy laurels and enhance his prestige. Fortunately the League of Nations supported by the Great Powers rushed in to stamp out a new conflagration and not only forced Pangalos to beat a hasty retreat but made him disburse an indemnity of 30,000,000 leva for the damage caused by his troops in the Petritch district. [1]

[1] Had the League intervened in the conflict which arose between Italy and Greece in 1923 and prevented the Italian bombard-

643 had stopped at no crime in order to further their nefa-
697 rious designs, the Government dealt a heavy blow to the prestige of Justice and undermined among the people confidence in law and morality. The real aim of the Goverment in passing this measure was to emancipate itself from the threat of finding itself placed in a minority through the defection of its more idealistically minded supporters, who very often disapproved of its policy. By winning over the partisans of Radoslavov by the grant of an amnesty to their leaders, the Government was hoping that it would ward off such a threat by eventually replacing their disgruntled followers by the Radoslavovists. Apparently the moral code of the trinity at the head of the government was not a very strict one as is manifest from the financial policy it foisted on the country and the liabilities it so lightheartedly assumed.

669 The commuting of punishments, and the granting of amnesties does not seem to have appeased either the Agrarians or the Communists, for towards the end of 1929 there was a distinct recrudescence in their activities. Armed bands penetrated from Yugoslavia and committed depredations and murders. A train was stopped and the passengers robbed, a number of judges were arrested and brutally shot near Sevlievo, the leader of the criminal band, responsible for these crimes, the notorious Dontso Uzunov, later took refuge in France, and though the Bulgarian Government applied for his extradition, this was refused on the pretext that the crime committed was of
661 a political character. The Government and its supporters paid little heed to the needs of the country, they were too intent on dividing among themselves the spoils of office. The booty was abundant, as it had been increased by the foreign loans recently concluded and there was enough for all their hungry followers. Millions were being showered upon prominent supporters of the Government